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Abstract
This article explores how the New Zealand Parliament scrutinises the quality of long-term 
governance and considers how such scrutiny could be made more systematic, proactive and 
rigorous. The analysis is based, among other things, on extensive interviews with current and 
former MPs and other active participants in the policy process. Interviewees were generally 
critical of the existing system of parliamentary scrutiny: it was variously described as ‘weak’, 
‘inadequate’, ‘cursory’, ‘patchy’ and ‘unduly partisan’. Scrutiny of long-term matters – such 
as governments’ strategies, foresight, planning and risk management – was seen as inferior, 
on average, to other forms of scrutiny, especially the scrutiny of legislation. Drawing on the 
suggestions of interviewees and the experience of legislatures in several other parliamentary 
democracies, we outline and assess various options for parliamentary reform.
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Parliament stands at the apex of New Zealand’s system of government (Geddis, 2016; Harris and Wilson, 
2017). It performs four vital functions: 
representing citizens, enacting legislation, 
providing governments, and holding 
governments to account. This article 
focuses on the last one of these functions 
– variously referred to as parliamentary 
oversight, scrutiny and accountability. 
Effective scrutiny of the executive branch 
of government by the legislature is 
critically important. It serves to incentivise 
good governance, enhance public trust in 
governmental institutions, and underwrite 
the legitimacy of the democratic political 
system. 
Much has been written over the years 
about how legislatures, both in New 
Zealand and in other parliamentary 
democracies, scrutinise the performance 
of ministers and public agencies (i.e. 
departments, Crown entities, state-owned 
enterprises, etc.), the specific parliamentary 
mechanisms that enable such scrutiny (e.g. 
oral and written questions of ministers, 
select committee inquiries and formal 
debates) and the strengths and weaknesses 
of these mechanisms (Office of the 
Auditor-General, 2019; White, 2015). To 
date, however, most assessments of the 
quality of parliamentary scrutiny have 
adopted a backward-looking, rather than 
a forward-looking, perspective. That is to 
say, the primary focus has been on how 
well legislatures hold ministers and public 
agencies to account for their past 
performance. By contrast, little attention 
has been given to how legislatures hold 
ministers and public agencies to account 
for the quality of their long-term 
governance – or what can be termed 
‘anticipatory governance’ (Boston, 2016; 
Fuerth and Faber, 2013). For instance, how 
well are governments planning for the 
future? Are ministers and their officials 
exercising sufficient foresight and prudent 
stewardship (Menzies, 2018)? Are 
important societal and environmental 
trends being actively monitored, reported 
and investigated (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 
2019)? Are known risks and looming 
problems being effectively mitigated and 
managed? Is vital public infrastructure 
sufficiently resilient (e.g. in the face of 
climate change and cascading risks) 
(Frieling and Warren, 2018)? Is there 
sufficient public investment in cost-
effective preventative measures? More 
generally, are the interests of future citizens 
being adequately protected and are 
governments giving proper consideration 
to well-established principles of 
intergenerational justice (Brown Weiss, 
1989)? Finally, are such matters being 
properly monitored and investigated by 
legislators? If not, what reforms might be 
needed?
To date, these questions, particularly 
when viewed through a parliamentary lens, 
have received remarkably little attention in 
the relevant international literature. For 
instance, while the literature on fiscal and 
environmental sustainability is vast, 
assessments of how – and the effectiveness 
with which – legislatures hold governments 
to account for the sustainability of their 
strategies and policies are few and far 
between. The situation in New Zealand is 
no exception. 
The purpose of this article is to help 
redress the balance. It is a timely exercise, 
not least because Parliament’s Standing 
Orders Committee is currently undertaking 
its triennial review of the standing orders, 
which provides an opportunity for 
Parliament to update its rules and practices. 
Similarly, both the State Sector Act 1988 
and the Public Finance Act 1989 have been 
under review (State Services Commission, 
2018; Treasury, 2018) and some of the 
proposed changes have implications for 
Parliament’s role in scrutinising the quality 
of long-term governance. These include 
requirements for: 
•	 Budget	policy	statements	to	explain	the	
nature of the ‘wellbeing objectives that 
will guide the Government’s Budget 
decisions’ and how those ‘objectives are 
intended to support long-term 
wellbeing in New Zealand’;
•	 the	 Treasury	 to	 produce	 periodic	
reports that provide a comprehensive, 
balanced and accessible assessment of 
the state of wellbeing in New Zealand, 
with indicators being selected and the 
reports prepared using the Treasury’s 
‘best professional judgements’;
•	 departments	to	prepare	periodic	‘long-
term insights briefings’; 
•	 the	 public	 service	 to	 support	 ‘the	
Government to pursue the long-term 
public interest’; and
•	 departmental	 chief	 executives	 to	
support their minister ‘to act as a good 
steward of the public interest’, including 
by ‘providing advice on the long-term 
implications of policies’ (see Public 
Finance (Wellbeing) Amendment Bill 
and Public Service Legislation Bill).
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, 
we briefly outline the research on which 
our analysis is based. Second, we comment 
briefly on the politics of time, noting 
especially the presentist bias that 
characterises democratic systems of 
governance and its implications for 
parliamentary oversight. Third, we discuss 
the current methods, and assess the quality, 
of parliamentary scrutiny in New Zealand, 
with particular reference to long-term 
matters of policy and governance. Fourth, 
we briefly survey how legislatures in several 
other parliamentary systems scrutinise the 
quality of long-term governance. Finally, 
based on our research, we outline how our 
Parliament’s systems, structures and 
procedures might be amended to ensure 
better scrutiny of long-term matters and 
that intergenerational issues are embedded 
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firmly within Parliament’s day-to-day 
operations.
Research methods 
This article draws primarily on the 
findings of a report published in mid-
2019 by the Institute for Governance and 
Policy Studies at Victoria University of 
Wellington (Boston, Bagnall and Barry, 
2019). The report, in turn, was based on 
a partnership between the Office of the 
Clerk of the House of Representatives and 
the institute during 2018–19. In preparing 
our report, we undertook a thorough 
review of the relevant international 
and domestic literature on long-term 
governance, parliamentary scrutiny and 
related issues, and conducted close to 60 
semi-structured interviews with current 
and former MPs, government officials, 
parliamentary staff and other researchers, 
both in New Zealand and overseas (ibid., 
pp.28–32). Those interviewed in New 
Zealand included 14 current MPs (five 
National, five Labour, three Green and two 
New Zealand First MPs), and six former 
MPs from a range of parties, including 
former ministers and backbenchers. A 
particular effort was made to secure the 
views of a representative sample of MPs 
at different stages of their parliamentary 
careers, from different ethnic and 
professional backgrounds, and with 
experience on a range of select committees. 
Additionally, we hosted a workshop with 
government officials and other relevant 
stakeholders, undertook exploratory case 
studies, conducted a survey of legislatures 
in Commonwealth jurisdictions, and 
received detailed feedback on our initial 
findings and proposals from numerous 
people. 
The politics of time
Any analysis of how legislatures scrutinise 
the quality of long-term governance raises 
the question of what the ‘long term’ means 
and what constitutes a ‘long-term policy 
matter’. In practice, it is hard to draw tidy 
lines between different time periods (e.g. 
short-term, medium-term and long-term). 
Similarly, it is difficult to divide policy 
issues neatly according to their temporal 
relevance or impacts. After all, many policy 
issues – and their effects – are enduring: 
think of crime, substance abuse, family 
violence, illnesses and accidents. In other 
cases, policy problems come and go, or 
their impacts wax and wane; in some cases 
their scale or seriousness may diminish, 
perhaps because policy interventions 
have become more effective (e.g. due to 
better treatments for chronic diseases). In 
yet other cases, policy problems increase 
over time: so-called ‘creeping problems’, 
like climate change, ocean acidification, 
micro-plastic pollution, and the increasing 
threats to privacy from public and 
private surveillance fall into this category. 
Such problems tend to emerge slowly, 
incrementally and often imperceptibly; 
they are thus largely ‘out of sight and out 
of mind’ until certain ‘tipping points’ are 
reached. 
While dividing time into neat bundles 
or defining ‘long term’ presents problems, 
several  matters are relatively 
uncontroversial. To start with, there are 
strong political pressures for governments 
and legislatures to focus on urgent issues, 
notably those which generate significant 
public concern (e.g. because of their 
serious near-term economic, social or 
environmental effects) (Jacobs, 2011, 2016). 
As a result, policy issues where the main 
societal or environmental impacts are 
relatively hidden or distant (e.g. a decade 
or more in the future) tend to receive a low 
political priority. Indeed, sometimes they 
are ignored altogether until their impacts 
become so widespread and visible that a 
governmental response is politically 
unavoidable. 
It is no surprise that governments 
prioritise matters of immediate public 
concern, as this reflects the structure of 
political incentives in contemporary 
democracies. Human temporal horizons 
are often limited: voters tend to be 
impatient, and governments want to be re-
elected. Hence, democracies display a 
short-termist or presentist bias (Healy and 
Malhorta, 2009; Thompson, 2005, 2010). 
Democratically elected legislatures are 
naturally and inescapably influenced by 
such forces. In seeking to hold governments 
to account, parliamentarians have strong 
incentives to focus on governments’ recent 
mistakes and misdemeanours rather than 
the rigour or adequacy of their strategising, 
foresight, forward planning or risk 
assessments. Likewise, MPs have powerful 
reasons to concentrate on the politically 
salient matters of today, rather than the 
critical, but seemingly distant, challenges 
of tomorrow.
Fortunately, these myopic propensities 
in democratic processes, along with their 
causes, are well understood. Knowing of 
the risks, governments have not been 
inactive. Indeed, across the OECD multiple 
remedies have been proposed and many 
implemented (Boston, 2017a, 2017b; 
González-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016). For 
instance, in some cases important decisions 
have been deliberately delegated to 
independent bodies – ones that are 
expected to be less influenced than elected 
officials by short-term political pressures. 
The transfer of key decisions on the 
implementation of monetary policy to 
central banks in most OECD countries is 
a good example. Alternatively, governments 
have instituted substantive and procedural 
‘commitment devices’ (Reeves, 2015): these 
aim to protect long-term interests by 
requiring governments to make decisions 
that they might otherwise prefer to avoid 
(e.g. setting long-term targets) or making 
it harder politically for them to abandon 
prudent policy settings (e.g. by embodying 
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principles of fiscal responsibility or 
ecological sustainability within legislation). 
These efforts are based on a crucial and 
not unreasonable assumption, namely that 
political incentives are not immutable; they 
can be tweaked and redirected. Hence, 
myopia need not be triumphant: the long 
term can be brought into sharper political 
focus and the temporal horizon of decision 
makers can be stretched. Bear in mind, too, 
that most citizens and those who represent 
them care deeply about the future – among 
other things, they desire a safe prospect for 
themselves and their offspring. The 
challenge is how to design our political 
institutions so that these ethical norms 
receive the attention they deserve. Our 
focus in what follows is on the parliamentary 
dimension of this challenge.
Parliamentary scrutiny in New Zealand:  
a brief assessment 
Accountability, in the sense of being 
answerable to someone for something, 
takes many forms (Mulgan, 2000; Office 
of the Auditor-General, 2019). For 
instance, useful distinctions can be made 
between political (electoral or democratic) 
accountability, administrative (bureaucratic 
or organisational) accountability, legal 
accountability, financial accountability and 
professional accountability. In the political 
arena all these forms of accountability 
are operative to one degree or another, 
and with varying levels of effectiveness. 
Invariably, they overlap and interact, often 
reinforcing each other. Collectively, within 
a parliamentary democracy, they generate 
multiple layers of scrutiny. In other words, 
the performance of ministers and their 
officials is scrutinised through a range of 
mechanisms. At least four distinct layers 
can be delineated (see Table 1).
First, governments face ongoing, and 
often intense, public scrutiny. This includes 
the activities of interest groups, businesses, 
researchers, think tanks, the courts, the 
media and social media. Second, there is 
the political layer of scrutiny. This is the 
persistent – and sometimes merciless – 
questioning of ministers and their officials 
by MPs, whether through questions and 
debate in the House, select committee 
processes or other forums. Much of this 
political scrutiny is driven by constant 
inter-party competition for electoral 
success. Third, there is an institutional layer 
of scrutiny. This complements and assists 
the political scrutiny conducted by MPs. It 
includes the work of: a) the three officers 
of Parliament (i.e., the Office of the 
Auditor-General, the parliamentary 
commissioner for the environment and the 
ombudsman; b) the two parliamentary 
agencies (i.e., the Parliamentary Service, 
which includes the Parliamentary Library, 
and the Office of the Clerk, which includes 
Select Committee Services and the 
Parliamentary Law and Practice team); and 
c) the formal rules and procedures of the 
House, which trigger and facilitate scrutiny 
processes. Finally, there is the formal 
accountability system, which is mandated 
through the statutory framework for public 
sector management and provides the vital 
supply of information that makes scrutiny 
possible. This includes the various regimes 
of financial management and performance 
management, and the related monitoring 
and reporting requirements, and internal 
controls within public agencies. The 
parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment’s recent (2019) report on New 
Zealand’s environmental reporting regime 
has highlighted the critical importance of 
such mechanisms for good long-term 
governance.
All four layers of scrutiny are vital for a 
healthy parliamentary democracy. Overall, 
our research indicated that while most of 
these layers in New Zealand are relatively 
effective, the scrutiny provided by the 
political layer is generally regarded as 
superficial or lacking in impact, and rarely 
engages with long-term matters. Certainly 
this was the assessment of many, if not 
most, interviewees. And their views were 
largely confirmed through our case studies 
and other investigations. Our findings can 
be summarised as follows.
First, many interviewees maintained 
that parliamentary scrutiny in New Zealand 
compares unfavourably with that in other 
advanced democracies. The scrutiny of 
legislation was regarded as a notable 
exception. Interviewees variously described 
existing oversight arrangements as ‘weak’, 
‘inadequate’, ‘cursory’, ‘patchy’ and ‘unduly 
partisan’. Such assessments were shared by 
both current and former MPs, and by MPs 
from across the House. Their views were 
also consistent with the evaluations of 
numerous officials and outside observers. 
This is not to suggest that the scrutiny 
activities of select committees (e.g. via their 
review of the Estimates or the conduct of 
inquiries) are generally poor. But by 
comparison with their counterparts in 
many other jurisdictions (e.g. Australia and 
Britain), our select committees undertake 
relatively few substantial inquiries. 
Landmark investigations which generate 
strong public interest or significant policy 
reforms are few and far between.
Second, and related to this, we 
undertook a review of 30 select committee 
inquiries conducted between late 2011 and 
late 2018. A key aim was to investigate the 
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Public
scrutiny
Public
Officers of Parliament
Parliamentary agencies
House
Select commitees
Monitoring agencies
Rules and procedures
Cabinet rules and
requirements
Statutory and administrative
reporting requirements
Internal agency controls and business
performance processes
Legislative Executive
Cabinet
Cabinet committees
Members Ministers
Media
Expert commentators
Political
scrutiny
Institutional
layer
Formal
accountability
Key:
Table 1: Multiple layers of parliamentary scrutiny
Source: Boston et al., 2019, p.63.
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extent to which such inquiries gave 
substantive consideration to long-term 
policy issues, including assessments of 
major government strategies, significant 
societal or environmental trends, or the 
mitigation and management of risks. The 
results were unambiguous: consideration 
of such matters was limited, ad hoc and 
unsystematic. Equally, the use of foresight 
techniques (e.g. horizon scanning and 
scenario analyses) by select committees has 
been rare, and questions of inter-
generational fairness typically receive little 
attention. 
Third, we undertook several case 
studies to investigate how much attention 
select committees give to major long-term 
government strategies (e.g. protecting 
biodiversity) and future-focused reports 
(e.g. dealing with fiscal, demographic and 
environmental trends). Again, the results 
indicated a lack of ongoing and rigorous 
parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial 
decisions and agency performance. Matters 
are not helped by the fact that, unlike in 
some other jurisdictions, governments are 
not legally obliged to produce regular 
reports on future societal trends (see Welsh 
Government, 2018), national risk 
assessments or social outcomes. Significant 
long-term strategies, such as the Sustainable 
Development Goals, receive only 
perfunctory attention by Parliament.
Overall, the incentives for, and capacity 
of, our parliamentarians to undertake 
systematic, rigorous and effective oversight 
of the executive branch are significantly 
constrained. Notable limitations include: 
•	 the	relatively	small	size	of	the	House	of	
Representatives by comparison with 
legislatures in most other OECD 
countries, which restricts the availability 
of MPs to sit on select committees and 
encourages strong party discipline; 
•	 the	absence	of	a	second	chamber,	such	
as the Australian Senate or the British 
House of Lords, with a particular focus 
on scrutiny activities;
•	 the	relatively	short	parliamentary	term	
(among the shortest in the democratic 
world, where the average electoral cycle 
for unicameral and lower houses is 4.7 
years);
•	 the	political	dominance	of	the	House	
by the executive, even in the context of 
minority governments; 
•	 the	high	workload	of	select	committees	
and the tendency for urgent and higher-
priority business, most notably the 
scrutiny of legislation, to crowd out 
other scrutiny functions, such as the 
conduct of in-depth inquiries into the 
performance of government agencies 
and the effectiveness of current policies; 
•	 the	lack	of	procedural	triggers	to	ensure	
that systematic scrutiny of long-term 
matters takes place;
•	 the	absence	of	one	or	more	permanent	
select committees with a primary 
mandate to scrutinise governmental 
performance, including in relation to 
long-term matters; and
•	 select	 committees’	 modest	 use	 of	
independent expert advice, including 
that available via the officers of 
Parliament and the academic 
community.
These limitations signal that several 
approaches can be taken to improve 
parliamentary scrutiny. It would be 
misguided to try to moderate the political 
nature of parliamentary life directly, 
because political motivations are inherent 
in representative democracy and provide 
its fundamental driving force. Instead, the 
approach should be to shape the 
institutional layer that provides 
opportunities for and supports political 
scrutiny, so that expectations of good 
scrutiny can influence and improve 
governance.
In all likelihood, the political layer of 
scrutiny in our governmental system 
would be stronger if there were significantly 
more MPs (e.g. 150+ rather than 120), an 
influential upper house, and a longer 
parliamentary term (e.g. four or five years). 
But constitutional reforms of this nature 
are not possible without the support of the 
majority of voters (e.g. via a referendum). 
Currently, the prospects of such support 
are low. Realistically, therefore, any reforms 
to improve parliamentary scrutiny of the 
quality of long-term governance must 
occur within the bounds of existing 
constitutional arrangements.
Lessons from other parliamentary systems
With that in mind, how do other 
parliaments scrutinise the quality of long-
term governance within their respective 
jurisdictions and what lessons are there 
for New Zealand?
To investigate such questions we 
conducted a survey of parliaments in other 
Commonwealth countries and reviewed 
the available academic and other literature 
on scrutiny arrangements. The results were 
not unexpected: overall, parliamentary 
systems do not address matters of long-
term governance in a comprehensive, 
systematic and rigorous manner. While 
scrutiny arrangements differ across the 
Commonwealth (and beyond), it is hard 
to identify what might be called ‘best 
practice’, particularly in relation to long-
term matters. Equally important, the 
evidence suggests that many factors affect 
the quality of parliamentary scrutiny that 
have little to do with specific legislative 
structures, procedures or support services. 
These include the nature of a country’s 
party system, political culture, civil society 
institutions, quasi-governmental 
institutions, public management systems 
and regulatory frameworks. 
Be that as it may, various parliamentary 
systems have sought over the years to 
improve the institutional settings that 
underpin political scrutiny, including in 
relation to long-term governance. Four 
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main approaches are evident, none of 
which are mutually exclusive: 
•	 the	implementation	of	new	procedural	
triggers (and other kinds of 
commitment devices) that require 
legislatures to undertake specific forms 
of long-term scrutiny; 
•	 the	establishment	of	permanent	or	ad	
hoc parliamentary committees with a 
mandate to address long-term matters; 
•	 the	establishment	of	 future-focused	
bodies that include parliamentary 
representation; and 
•	 efforts	 to	 enhance	 the	 independent	
analytical resources available to MPs 
and parliamentary committees. 
Examples of such approaches include: 
•	 requirements	for	legislatures	to	review	
governmental reports on long-term 
policy issues (e.g. in Finland) or for 
legislatures to approve the long-term 
plans and strategies of governments;
•	 the	 creation	 of 	 permanent	
parliamentary committees to conduct 
major policy inquiries, some of which 
have significant long-term implications;
•	 the	 creation	 of	 parliamentary	
committees specifically dedicated to 
exploring long-term or future-focused 
matters, including the conduct of 
foresight exercises or the scrutiny of 
governments’ long-term strategies (e.g. 
the Committee for the Future in 
Finland and the House of Lords ad hoc 
Committee on Intergenerational 
Fairness and Provision);
•	 the	creation	of	future-focused	bodies	
bringing together legislators and 
representatives of major civil society 
organisations and research institutions, 
such as Scotland’s Futures Forum 
(Wilson, 2016); and
•	 the	 creation	 or	 strengthening	 of	
i n d e p e n d e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangements to provide advice to 
legislators on major policy issues or 
help legislators to undertake their long-
term scrutiny functions. These 
arrangements include providing 
additional analytical and research 
support for parliamentary committees 
(e.g. via the Parliamentary Office for 
Science and Technology in the UK 
Parliament) and establishing new 
parliamentary institutions dedicated to 
future-oriented issues (e.g. the Office 
Enhancing long-term governance – Parliament’s vital oversight role
Table 2:  Indicators for evaluating parliamentary scrutiny of long-term governance
Type of 
indicator
Indicator Example of measure
Political 
and public 
engagement
Connection of 
MPs and the 
public with 
long-term 
issues
1. Active committee scrutiny of long-
term issues
Select committee meeting 
hours spent on long-term 
scrutiny
Number of substantive select 
committee reports
2. Inquiries into long-term issues Number of inquiries initiated
3. Regular plenary debate of long-
term issues
Number of debates
4. Public awareness of parliamentary 
scrutiny of long-term issues
Parliamentary engagement 
data
5. Public participation in framing 
long-term issues and outcomes
Number of participation 
opportunities 
Robustness
Empowerment 
of effective 
scrutiny 
through 
opportunities 
and capability
 
6. Parliamentary rules embedding 
procedural triggers for scrutiny of 
long-term issues
Parliamentary rules adopted
7. Parliamentary rules requiring 
regular cycles for scrutiny of 
progress against long-term 
objectives
Parliamentary rules adopted
8. Work programmes of committees 
include in-depth inquiry into long-
term issues
Committee work programmes
9. Adequate workload capacity of 
committees or other scrutiny 
bodies
Overall committee meeting 
hours
10. Use of criteria for assessing 
anticipatory governance
Accessible set of criteria for 
parliamentary use
11. Dedicated research and advisory 
support for MPs and committees
Data about support provided 
by Officers of Parliament and 
parliamentary agencies
12. Ready access to, or ongoing 
partnership with, independent 
expert advice about long-term 
issues
Availability of independent 
advisors 
Established partnerships
Impact
Effect on 
quality of 
long-term 
governance 
13. Strong government expectation of 
parliamentary scrutiny
Parliamentary rules adopted
14. Coherent statutory commitment 
devices
Statutory commitment devices 
in place
15. Measurable long-term policy 
objectives, targets and monitoring, 
reported to House
Framework adopted for setting 
objectives and targets, and 
reporting
16. Clear accountability for 
stewardship
Identifiable accountability 
mechanism
17. Impact on policy outcomes Evidence of impact
18. Follow-up mechanisms as part of 
scrutiny model
Follow-up mechanisms in 
place
Durability 
Continued 
effectiveness 
of scrutiny 
model 
19. Broad political support for scrutiny 
model
Explicit cross-party support for 
scrutiny model
20. Scrutiny without frustration of 
governance
Analysis of parliamentary rules
21. Public confidence in scrutiny 
model
Public engagement data
22. Certainty of resources for scrutiny 
model
Funding decision-making 
process
23. Ongoing relevance of scrutiny 
model 
Mechanism to review and 
update scrutiny model
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of Budget Responsibility at Westminster 
and the Commissioner for Future 
Generations in Wales) (Davies, 2016).
It is difficult to assess the relative merits 
of these different approaches. For one 
thing, detailed independent analyses of the 
various approaches are few and far between, 
and the methodological issues surrounding 
attribution and causality are formidable. 
For another, while a specific approach 
might be relatively effective in a particular 
parliamentary system, its applicability 
elsewhere might be limited by contextual 
factors. 
For instance, the creation of the 
Committee for the Future in the Finnish 
Parliament in the early 1990s is often cited 
as an example of a successful reform. It is 
claimed, among other things, to have 
enhanced the quality of debate in Finland 
on major long-term policy issues, 
encouraged the use of foresight in 
governmental policymaking, and ensured 
that the Finnish government’s periodic 
reports on the future are properly 
scrutinised (Boston, 2017a, pp.401–17; 
Groombridge, 2006; Tiihonen, 2011). But 
to the extent that the committee has been 
effective, part of the reason probably lies 
in a strong multiparty commitment to 
evidence-informed decision making and a 
political culture that values scientific 
inquiry and the exercise of foresight. 
Without these ingredients, the committee 
may well have struggled to gain traction.
Nevertheless, based on the available 
international evidence, several conclusions 
can be proffered. First, there are no ‘silver 
bullets’ for improving the quality of 
scrutiny provided by the political layer. 
This applies equally to scrutiny in general 
and to the scrutiny of long-term governance. 
Second, and related to this, an integrated 
package of reforms is likely to be best. 
Ideally, this should include structural 
changes, new procedural triggers (i.e. 
commitment devices), and the provision 
of additional analytical resources and 
independent advice for select committees 
(i.e. advice that is independent of the 
executive branch). Third, a key goal must 
be to integrate and embed long-term 
matters in normal day-to-day 
parliamentary routines and practices. 
Intergenerational issues, creeping problems 
and long-term risks must be constantly and 
automatically brought to the fore; they 
must no longer be treated as optional 
extras, or nice-to-have, but non-essential, 
appendages. 
Finally, there is merit in devising 
criteria to assess any new framework for 
parliamentary scrutiny of long-term 
governance. Table 2 outlines four such 
criteria – political and public engagement, 
robustness, impact and durability – 
together with a series of performance 
indicators and possible ways to measure 
impacts. Plainly, some of the suggested 
indicators will be difficult to evaluate, 
partly because of data gaps. Nonetheless, 
the proposed framework represents a good 
place to start. 
Bringing the long term into short-term 
parliamentary focus
Given these considerations, what reforms 
should our Parliament consider in the 
interests of better scrutiny, and especially 
better oversight of long-term matters? Our 
report canvassed a wide range of options. 
Most, but not all, were concerned with the 
structure, role, conduct and resourcing 
of select committees, and most of our 
suggestions will entail changes to the 
standing orders – some minor, but others 
more significant.
Select committee structures
By comparison with many other 
legislatures, the New Zealand Parliament 
lacks select committees that are dedicated 
primarily or exclusively to the scrutiny 
of governmental policies, activities and 
performance. There is, for instance, no 
Public Accounts Committee or specialist 
Governance Committee. Instead, most 
committees have multiple roles and 
spend much of their time on scrutinising 
government bills. Without creating one or 
more specialist committees with a strong 
focus on non-legislative scrutiny (or 
allocating specialist scrutiny functions to 
particular committees), it will be difficult 
to enhance the quality of non-legislative 
scrutiny. 
Our report outlines various options for 
establishing one or more committees with 
the specialist function of scrutinising long-
term governance. One of these would be 
to create a Committee for the Future – 
fashioned, at least in part, on the Finnish 
model. Other options would involve 
creating a specialist function of long-term 
governance and/or requiring select 
committees to undertake designated tasks, 
such as outcome reviews, wellbeing reviews, 
stewardship reviews or sustainability 
reviews in their specific areas of 
responsibility.
Creating new committees poses a 
problem. As it stands, there are barely 
enough MPs to service the existing 
structure of select committees. The current 
system can only operate because some MPs 
(especially government backbenchers) 
serve on two or even three committees. On 
the other hand, most select committees are 
now larger than was envisaged when the 
Parliament first adapted to the MMP 
electoral system. In 1996, the rules 
indicated that committees should have 
eight members. But in the present term of 
Parliament the committees generally have 
between eight and 11 members, with one 
(the Finance and Expenditure Committee) 
that has 13 members. There is scope for 
reducing the average size of select 
committees, thereby freeing up capacity for 
a specialist-function committee dedicated 
to governmental and/or long-term scrutiny. 
A further issue with the current 
structure and functions of select 
committees is that, while the subject select 
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committee structure was designed in 1985 
to enable the robust examination of 
government policies and performance 
through inquiries, this has not been a 
strong feature of committee work in recent 
times. This is partly because committees 
are generally preoccupied with considering 
legislation, annual financial cycles and 
petitions, and also perhaps because 
committees no longer place great priority 
on inquiry work. A rejig of the committee 
structure to reduce competing demands 
on the time and attention of subject select 
committees could provide renewed 
impetus to carry out inquiries into long-
term matters. 
Select committee processes and procedural 
triggers
Aside from issues of structure, long-
term matters will receive systematic 
parliamentary attention only if 
specific requirements to this effect are 
incorporated into the standing orders. 
Rules that trigger specific procedures are 
already dotted throughout the standing 
orders in respect of, say, financial scrutiny, 
and these could be augmented with 
provisions that generate examinations 
of long-term governance. There are two 
such triggers already – the presentation of 
the government’s statement on the long-
term fiscal position and the investment 
statement – but each of these is activated 
very infrequently: only once every 
four years. Effective scrutiny requires a 
more regular regimen of reporting and 
parliamentary examination. 
Our report therefore suggested 
introducing new procedural triggers to 
ensure that select committees give greater 
attention to particular oversight functions, 
such as the scrutiny of government 
strategies and issues with major long-term 
implications. Ideally, such procedures 
would be based on formal accountability 
requirements set out in statutes. A 
proposed requirement along these lines has 
been included in the recently introduced 
Public Service Legislation Bill, in the form 
of long-term insights briefings prepared 
by departmental chief executives (see 
schedule 6, clause 8). Clearly, if the bill 
were passed with the provision for long-
term insights briefings retained, then the 
House’s procedures should be updated to 
take advantage of this new mechanism by 
placing the briefings before select 
committees for consideration. The 
proposal is for the briefings to be relatively 
intermittent – that is, at least once every 
three years – but they could provide a 
valuable basis for select committees to 
consider possible forward-looking 
inquiries. This would especially be the case 
if the briefings were available during the 
first year of each term of Parliament. A 
further potential statutory mechanism 
could be the proposed provision for four-
yearly wellbeing reports to be prepared by 
the Treasury, under the Public Finance 
(Wellbeing) Amendment Bill.
The House can adopt scrutiny 
procedures without needing them to be 
based on statutory reports. For example, a 
new specialist-function committee could 
be given an explicit remit to examine the 
government’s progress in relation to long-
term strategies, plans and targets. 
Objectives for long-term outcomes are 
signalled in a number of laws and public 
undertakings – for example, targets relating 
to child poverty reduction, the protection 
of biodiversity and the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The specialist-
function committee could be given 
responsibility for examining such 
commitments, and progress towards them, 
and generally for reviewing the 
government’s approach to the prudent 
management of the country’s long-term 
interests. 
While a specialist-function select 
committee would be a useful addition to 
the House’s capacity for examining long-
term issues, other options are available. For 
instance, existing financial scrutiny 
procedures could be adjusted to include 
specific reference to the alignment of 
government spending and performance 
with long-term outcomes. Committees 
could also be given the task of reviewing 
the stewardship of the public service as a 
whole, and of particular departments, 
based on the proposed stewardship 
responsibilities set out in the Public Service 
Legislation Bill (see clauses 10 and 50). 
Finally, committees could find ways to 
improve the effectiveness of their practices 
aside from making changes to the standing 
orders. Committees could focus the terms 
of reference for inquiries on long-term 
matters, and could form a strong 
convention of following up on the 
recommendations in their reports. Another 
mechanism would be to ensure that long-
term issues raised in reports of officers of 
Parliament – that is, the Office of the 
Auditor-General , par l iamentar y 
commissioner for the environment and the 
ombudsman – are vigorously pursued and, 
where appropriate, result in committee 
recommendations to the government. 
Other changes to practice could include 
the allocation of more time for financial 
scrutiny hearings, to enable more in-depth 
exploration of targets and performance. 
Committees could combine for joint 
consideration of cross-sector programmes. 
And when considering legislation, 
committees could make a point of 
reviewing the long-term implications of 
bills. These are just a few ways committees 
could more actively scrutinise the detail 
and outcomes of the government’s actions, 
especially in relation to long-term matters. 
Select committee resources
Select committees have ready access to 
advice from the officers of Parliament, 
especially the Office of the Auditor-
General and parliamentary commissioner 
for the environment, but do not seek this 
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very frequently, except during the financial 
scrutiny procedures. Also, committees 
can seek advice from other independent 
experts, which would usually be funded by 
the Office of the Clerk on request; again, 
this avenue of support is underutilised. 
There is undoubtedly scope for select 
committees to make greater use of such 
independent advice, and it would be useful 
to find ways to facilitate such input.
Another issue relates to scientific advice. 
A high proportion of policy issues, 
especially those of a long-term nature, have 
a scientific dimension and thus require a 
good understanding of the latest scientific 
evidence. Currently, few staff in the Office 
of the Clerk, Parliamentary Library or 
Office of the Auditor-General have 
scientific training. Likewise, relatively few 
MPs have postgraduate qualifications (or 
even undergraduate degrees) in a scientific 
discipline, and at any rate the robustness 
of scrutiny should not depend on the 
technical qualifications that happen to be 
held by people elected to Parliament. There 
is no equivalent in the New Zealand 
Parliament of the Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology (POST) in the UK 
(Clark and Morton, 2008; Kenny et al., 
2017; Kumar and Cope, 2008). For such 
reasons, our MPs and select committees 
are heavily dependent for their scientific 
advice on scientists employed by 
government departments and agencies. 
While there is no reason to question the 
capability, expertise or professionalism of 
such staff, the fact that they are employed 
to serve the elected government is bound 
to affect the nature, range and independence 
of the advice they offer to MPs, not to 
mention their being made available to 
committees in the first place. Our report 
notes that the prime minister and many 
government departments now have their 
own designated chief science advisors. 
Arguably, there is a case for the appointment 
of a chief parliamentary science advisor, as 
well as fostering much stronger links 
between Parliament and the wider scientific 
community (e.g. via the Royal Society of 
New Zealand) (Jeffares et al., 2019). Our 
report offers a number of options for 
progressing such arrangements.
Enhancing consideration of long-term 
matters by the House
Aside from changes to the structure, 
operations and resourcing of select 
committees, there are various ways 
to ensure that long-term matters are 
considered more systematically by the 
House. One option would be to require 
the prime minister’s statement on the 
first sitting day of each calendar year 
(except at the beginning of a term of 
Parliament) to include information about 
long-term matters (e.g., the government’s 
strategies for addressing major long-
term challenges). Additionally, standing 
order 354 could be amended so that the 
statements are referred to the Governance 
and Administration Committee (or a 
Governance Committee) for consideration 
of the long-term aspects.
Another option would be to revise the 
current arrangements for oral questions in 
the House to provide for periodic, 
additional question sessions focusing on 
long-term matters. Potentially, this 
question session could be followed by a 
debate on an issue with significant long-
term implications. Yet another possibility 
would be to require additional debates on 
government reports that focus on long-
term matters. Currently, standing order 
336(5) requires a debate on the statement 
on the long-term fiscal position and on the 
investment statement, each of which occurs 
at four-yearly intervals. Other current or 
future documents, such as the proposed 
long-term insights briefings and wellbeing 
reports, could be added to this list. 
Establishing a procedure for regular 
debates on major issues would provide a 
mechanism for matters of long-term 
importance to be discussed in the House. 
Such special debates would be similar to 
adjournment debates in the British House 
of Commons. The timing of these special 
debates could be stipulated in the standing 
orders, as occurring on a periodic basis, or 
left to the discretion of the Business 
Committee. While it is already within the 
gift of the Business Committee to arrange 
such debates, this does not happen often 
because there is no expectation that such 
debates will be held with any regularity.
Conclusion
Robust and systematic parliamentary 
scrutiny of the executive is critically 
important for ensuring good governance 
and protecting the public interest. But 
current arrangements in New Zealand are 
unsatisfactory. This applies particularly 
to the scrutiny of long-term governance: 
oversight of such matters is generally ad hoc, 
limited, reactive and unsystematic. Given 
the many serious global and local threats 
to the wellbeing of future generations, 
better parliamentary scrutiny of long-
term matters is vital. The quest, in other 
words, must be for more forward-looking, 
systematic and proactive legislative 
oversight. This article has outlined some 
of the ways that such oversight might 
be secured. A wider range of options is 
canvassed in our report.
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